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Government ownership of publicly listed companies and its effects have been of great
interest in the finance community for decades. This research will focus on European
companies which have national government ownership and whether or not this has an
impact on the ESG performance of these companies. The regression analysis indicates
that government ownership has a negative impact on the ESG performance of com-
panies. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that the negative impact of national
government ownership on ESG performance is due to the large negative impact on cor-
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Government involvement in companies has been studied from multiple points of view. The
effects on profitability, leverage, labor intensity, corporate governance performance, and
many other indicators have been researched. (e.g. Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001, Borisova,
Brockman, Salas, & Zagorchev, 2012) In this paper, I focus on a novel aspect of the effects
of government ownership, its impact on the ESG performance of companies. As mentioned,
previous research has found that the effects of government ownership on corporate gover-
nance are negative. This effect is divided between the two existing legal systems that prevail
in the EU. In civil law countries the government involvement has a negative effect and the
opposite is found in common law countries where the effect is positive. (e.g. Borisova et
al., 2012 )
This knowledge from previous research provides a basis for the hypothesis of this study.
As corporate governance is one of the three main pillars of ESG, the effects of government
ownership on environmental and social performance will need to be significantly positive
in order to make the total effect on ESG performance neutral or positive. However, na-
tional governments as owners would seem to in theory be more interested in the social and
environmental consequences of the companies they own compared to other owners.
One of the world’s largest and most respected investment authorities is the Government
Pension Fund of Norway which is composed of a national and an international fund. The
international fund has been active in ESG related issues. One example of this activity is
the divestments in coal and tobacco companies in 2010 and 2014 respectively. The fund has
an ethical board which, in co-operation with the data gathered on ESG issues by research
provider RepRisk, the global ESG risk business intelligence provider, works to make sure
that the fund’s investments follow its ethical guidelines.
This paper begins by studying the effect of national government ownership on the ESG
scores with a large sample of European companies. The findings of the initial analysis
demonstrate that impact on the ESG score is negative and significant. As legal origin has
been shown to affect the relation between government owners and companies, the difference
between civil and common law countries is analyzed by adding an interaction variable.
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(e.g. Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998, Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny,
1999) However, the introduction of this interaction variable does not give any statistically
significant results for differences in ESG performance. As ESG is built upon three pillars,
the impact of these three aspects are further analyzed with three separate regressions. The
findings in this paper are partly in line with Borisova et al. (2012) as government ownership
obtains a significant negative effect on corporate governance scores in the regression analysis.
However, a statistically significant effect depending on the legal origin is not found for the
interaction variable. The impact on social score are also both statistically significant and
negative. However, environmental scores are not impacted significantly in our analysis.
The remainder of this paper will continue as follows. Related literature on ESG and
government ownership will be summarized in Section 2. Section 3 will describe the data
utilized in the conducted regression analysis and the results of this analysis are presented in




Dahlsrud (2008) finds that although there does not seem to be one universal definition for
CSR, the definitions used by different parties are consistent with each other. Furthermore,
almost all of the definitions utilize at least three of the five dimensions related to CSR which
are: (1) Environmental, (2) Social, (3) Economic, (4) Stakeholder and (5) Voluntariness.
Marrewijk (2003) concludes that the CSR definitions need to be constructed by taking
into account the different development, awareness and ambition levels of organizations.
Moreover, ESG can be seen as a kind of sub-concept within CSR which is increasingly used
by investors in order to evaluate how companies follow the principles of CSR.
ESG related questions have been on the rise from the beginning of the millennium and
it seems like during the last couple of years the talk around them has only increased. As
one example of this, in 2006 the United Nations in co-operation with institutional investors
formed the Principles for Responsible Investment. The formation of this institution aims to
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increase the number of long-term investors committed to utilizing the six main principles
in their investment decisions. The initial signatories to these United Nations principles
included around 100 investors. Since then, the number has increased to over 1700. Further-
more, the assets under management by signatory institutions have increased from under 6.5
trillion to just under 70 trillion USD.
There have been numerous studies carried out relating to the positive connection be-
tween company financial performance and CSR performance. Tsoutsoura (2004) conducted
a study on US companies, and better CSR performance was shown to affect ROA in par-
ticular but also ROE and ROS. The tie between financial performance and ESG/CSR does
however seem to work in both ways, making it difficult to say which affects which. (e.g.
Ameer & Othman, 2012)
Given that implementing ESG practices have been shown to improve the financial per-
formance of companies, it is only natural that the performance of portfolios considering
ESG factors have also been found to be positive. Portfolios that hold stock with the high-
est social responsibility ratings and sell stock with the lowest rating have been found to
provide significant abnormal returns when taking into account normal transaction costs.
(e.g. Kempf & Osthoff, 2007 ). Previous research also indicates that companies performing
better in CSR also have better financial performance e.g. profitability, growth and stock
performance during a financial crisis. (e.g Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017)
Be it due to the possible improved financial performance of investments performing bet-
ter in ESG issues or the will of investors to make a difference with their invested capital,
investments in sustainable assets have been on the rise. The growth of sustainable invest-
ment assets from 2012 to 2016 was 72.2 percent, from 13.3 trillion to 22.9 trillion USD.
Australia and New Zealand have had the fastest growth rates during the period. Moreover,
sustainable investment assets have had a faster growth than traditional investment assets
during the same period. (Global Sustainable Investment Alliance 2014, 2016) One might
question if the observed growth is due to improved financial performance of investments
performing better as a result of ESG, or because of the will of investors to make a difference
with their invested capital?
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2.2 Government ownership
Based on the report published by the European Commission, the financial performance
of partly and fully state-owned companies in all analyzed industries is statistically and
economically worse than that of privately owned companies. However, the performance
differences were observed to decrease during the financial crisis. D’souza and Megginson
(1999), in line with previous research (e.g. Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; Megginson, Nash,
& Randenborgh, 1994), found in their research that the privatization of companies leads
to a significant increase in financial performance, ranging from profitability to dividend
payments.
The reasoning behind the perceived inefficiencies resulting from privatization of compa-
nies and the resulting increase in financial performance may be due to political aspirations
and ties. Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find in their study that the political ties between
corporations and the government influence the funding gathered from the Troubled As-
set Relief Program. This finding implies that decisions made by the government are not
only based on financial metrics. Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2015) discovered in
their study that investments made by sovereign wealth funds have a negative effect on the
operating performance of public companies in general and in particular when compared to
investments made by private investors. Moreover, the size of this effect will differ depending
on how politically connected and transparent the sovereign wealth fund is.
As discussed previously, the legal origins of the country play a role in how the government
tends to act towards its holdings. Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) identified
the two different ways that governments influence companies. In the development view,
governments are expected to aid companies when they are in need of additional resources,
and by doing so they are acting based on the greater good of the country. On the contrary,
in the political view governments become involved in companies due to their own political
incentives, such as ensuring they get votes or even making decisions based on bribes. The
division of these two views between common and civil law countries is that common law
countries tend to act more like the development view indicates and civil law countries as
the political view.
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3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data
This paper uses Thomson Reuters ESG scores to measure ESG performance. The ESG score
is based on ten factors measured by Thomson Reuters. For rating environmental perfor-
mance: resource use, emissions and innovation. For rating social performance: workforce,
human rights, community and product responsibility. And for rating corporate governance
performance: management, shareholders and CSR strategy. ESG performance is rated from
0 to 100. The ESG scores were collected for all companies that were rated in the EU by
Thomson Reuters during 2012-2016. The data was available for 808 companies. Further-
more, additional company specific data was also collected through Thomson Reuters Eikon
and Datastream. Companies that were not found to have the necessary data available were
removed from the analysis. This resulted in a sample of 767 companies. The financial data
and ESG scores were collected on an annual bases.
To begin to identify the national government ownership in the companies, the Privati-
zation Barometer was utilized which provides data of all companies privatized in the EU.
Then the annual reports of the companies found in both the sample and the Barometer were
reviewed for information about significant shareholdings in these companies. After this the
sample was reduced to only those industries in which companies had national government
ownership. The total sample at this point was 528 companies. Then all of the companies in
the sample were inspected to find companies that had national government ownership but
were not listed in the Privatization Barometer.
Based on the above process, the sample stood at 528 companies, of which 108 had had
national government ownership during the sample period. The average national government
ownership within the companies owned partly by national governments during the time
period used in this study was 28.9 percent and within the total sample 5.9 percent. To
depict the level of national government ownership in a company, a variable from zero to one
was utilized.
As mentioned previously, company level variables were utilized as control variables that
were gathered from Thomson Reuters and Datastream. Company size was taken into ac-
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count based on the log of total assets in euros, and revenue growth was depicted by the
change in revenue divided by the revenue in the previous year. Company profitability was
determined on the return on assets. Leverage was depicted by the total debt divided by
the company’s total assets. Board gender diversity was measured using the percentage of
total board members, and this measure has previously been shown to impact ESG/CSR
performance positively. (e.g. Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010) Whether or not the company
pays out dividend was portrayed with a dividend dummy which takes the value of one if
the company does pay out dividend and zero if it does not.
Multiple country level variables were also included in the regression analysis. Because
the legal system of countries has been shown to affect the actions of the state as an owner
as well as corporate governance actions, this variable was incorporated in the analysis as
a dummy variable which took the value of one when the country in which the company is
based in is a civil law country and the value of zero when it is determined to be a common
law country. Country level economic performance measures were also incorporated. These
included the log of GDP per capita in constant 2011 dollars with purchase price parity,
and the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local
currency. The GDP data was collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI)
Database which is provided by the World Bank.
Table 1 depicts the correlation matrix for the independent variables. Table 2 presents
the statistics for all of the variables used in the main regression analysis of this study.
The national government ownership figures used in the regressions were lagged to minimize
the likelihood of endogeneity. Futhermore, the unbounded variables (assets size, return on
assets, leverage and revenue growth) were all winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles to
remove possible outliers from the dataset.
3.2 Methodology
For testing the main hypothesis, that national government ownership has a significant rela-
tionship with ESG performance, the company ESG score was regressed on national govern-
ment ownership, firm and country level explanatory variables, as well as year and industry
level fixed effects. Country level fixed effects were not been implemented because a civil law
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Table 1: Correlation coefficients
The below table presents the correlation coefficients of the independent variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Log (assets) 1
Legal origin 0.207 1
ROA -0.253 -0.1 1
Board gender diversity 0.244 0.168 -0.006 1
Log (GDP per capita) -0.018 0.046 0.061 0.219 1
GDP growth -0.039 -0.315 0.062 0.057 0.277 1
National government ownership 0.221 0.146 -0.083 0.027 -0.116 -0.03 1
Leverage 0.448 0.101 -0.353 0.065 -0.093 -0.074 0.149 1
Revenue growth -0.059 -0.062 0.269 -0.074 -0.007 0.03 -0.051 -0.087 1
Dividend dummy 0.145 0.012 0.354 0.092 0.044 -0.021 -0.046 -0.155 0.126 1
Table 2: Summary of data
The sample is made out of 528 companies of which 402 were totally privately owned and 108 have
national government ownership during the time period from 2011 to 2015. Due to the national
government ownership being lagged the other variables are from the time period 2012 to 2016.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
ESG score 2,640 59.809 16.710 8.446 95.407
Log (assets) 2,640 9.974 0.817 8.154 11.617
Legal origin 2,640 0.714 0.452 0 1
ROA 2,640 3.608 4.720 −5.405 11.932
Board gender diversity 2,640 20.693 12.624 0.000 66.667
Log (GDP per capita) 2,640 4.597 0.099 4.352 4.987
GDP growth 2,640 1.385 2.418 −7.300 26.276
National government ownership 2,640 0.059 0.171 0.000 1.000
Leverage 2,640 40.981 24.821 −13.314 89.964
Revenue growth 2,640 0.016 0.107 −0.180 0.213
Dividend dummy 2,640 0.808 0.394 0 1
7
dummy variable was employed, which act as a linear function of country dummy variables.
The regression analysis does not take into account the possibility of reverse causality,
i.e. the companies that national governments own might already be worse than others. For
example, governments may end up as owners of poorly performing companies as a result
of bailouts. To account for this, a univariate test for change in ESG score when national
government ownership increases and decreases was conducted. The Student’s one sample
T-test was used for measuring if the median of the change was significantly different from
zero. If the test suggested that ESG scores decrease (increase) significantly when national
government ownership increases (decreases), the causality of the two could be analyzed.
ESG scoreit = α0 + β1Nit + β2Xit + γk + µj + it (1)
The effect of national government ownership was estimated using the above regression
model where ESG score is the dependent variable. The subscript i refers to the company
and t to the year. Nit represents the vector of national government ownership and β1 its
coefficient. Xit represents the matrix of company and country-level variables and β2 is
a vector of their coefficients. γk represents the industry fixed effects, k ∈ {1, ..., 9}. µj
represents the annual fixed effects and j ∈ {1, ..., 5}. it is the error term.
Based on the premise of this study, the primary interest was in the statistical and
economical significance of the β1 coefficient and whether it was positive or negative. If the
coefficient was found to be positive, this implied that national government ownership had a
positive impact on the ESG performance of the company. Moreover, a negative coefficient
had a negative impact on ESG performance.
4 Empirical results
4.1 National government ownership and ESG performance
Model 1 in Table 3 below presents the result of the primary regression where ESG score is
the dependent variable and is regressed on the independent variables. Models 2, 3 and 4
have environmental, social and corporate governance scores as the dependent variables and
regress these on the same independent variables as in Model 1. The national government
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ownership coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level and negative (-11.579) in
Model 1. This finding suggests that national government ownership does in fact have a
negative effect on the ESG performance of the company.
The negative effect of national government ownership on ESG performance can be ex-
plained at least partly by the negative correlation between national government ownership
and corporate governance performance, which has been demonstrated in previous research.
(e.g. Borisova et al., 2012) Due to those research observations, three separate regressions
were implemented in which national government ownership and the other independent vari-
ables are regressed on environmental, social and corporate governance scores. This was
done in order to determine if there are connections between the two other variables making
up ESG performance and national government ownership. The scores for environmental,
social and corporate governance performance were gathered from Datastream. This was
due to Thomson Reuters Eikon not providing separate data for those. The performance of
all three variables were rated from 0 to 100 based on the same methodology used in scoring
ESG performance, 0 being the worst possible score and 100 being the best.
In Model 2, the impact of national government ownership on environmental score was
not found to be statistically significant and was found to have a small negative coefficient.
Thus, national government ownership cannot seem to be used to explain the environmental
performance of the company in question. However, in Models 3 and 4 the coefficients of
national government ownership are both negative and statistically significant at the 1%
level. The coefficient in Model 3 for national government ownership on the social score is
-6.481 and in Model 4 on the corporate governance score is -15.947. This result expresses
that the impact of national government ownership on social performance is negative in
addition to the negative impact to corporate governance, which is in line with the findings
of previous research.
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Table 3: Regression model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
National government ownership −11.579∗∗∗ −2.585 −6.481∗∗∗ −15.947∗∗∗
(1.574) (2.548) (2.430) (2.516)
Log (Assets) 13.440∗∗∗ 17.710∗∗∗ 15.068∗∗∗ 7.698∗∗∗
(0.414) (0.670) (0.639) (0.661)
Civil law dummy −5.335∗∗∗ −4.385∗∗∗ −3.176∗∗∗ −31.699∗∗∗
(0.617) (0.999) (0.953) (0.987)
ROA 0.075 −0.011 0.226∗∗ −0.161
(0.063) (0.102) (0.097) (0.101)
Board gender diversity 0.274∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035)
Leverage 0.004 0.047∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Revenue growth −4.071∗ −13.906∗∗∗ −8.289∗∗ −0.627
(2.423) (3.922) (3.740) (3.873)
Dividend dummy 3.162∗∗∗ 6.428∗∗∗ 6.503∗∗∗ 2.716∗∗
(0.712) (1.153) (1.100) (1.139)
Log (GDP per capita) −3.750 −6.404 −2.058 16.432∗∗∗
(2.790) (4.517) (4.307) (4.460)
GDP growth −0.445∗∗∗ −1.002∗∗∗ −1.001∗∗∗ −0.688∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.197) (0.188) (0.195)
Constant −60.907∗∗∗ −100.206∗∗∗ −84.824∗∗∗ −76.972∗∗∗
(13.166) (21.316) (20.328) (21.049)
Observations 2,640 2,640 2,640 2,640
R2 0.436 0.443 0.382 0.372
Adjusted R2 0.432 0.439 0.377 0.367
Residual Std. Error (df = 2617) 12.597 20.395 19.449 20.139
F Statistic (df = 22; 2617) 92.142∗∗∗ 94.790∗∗∗ 73.560∗∗∗ 70.424∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.2 Robustness checks
As mentioned previously, the legal origin of governments plays a significant role in how
they act as owners. Therefore, it is of great interest to examine if there is a difference in
the effect of national government ownership between civil and common law countries. To
do this, an interaction variable is utilized between national government ownership and the
civil law dummy. By implementing an interaction variable we will discover if there truly is
a difference in the impacts in common and civil law countries.
In the case that both the interaction variable and the national government ownership
variable are statistically significant, the difference can be calculated. The impact of the two
different legal systems will be calculated as the sum of the national government ownership
coefficient and national government ownership times the civil law dummy, where the civil
law dummy will take the value of zero in the case of a common law country and one in the
case of a civil law country.
Table 4 displays the regression results of the new regression where the interaction vari-
able has been added in the second row of the independent variables. In model 1, the impact
of national government ownership on ESG score is negative and statistically significant but
the newly added interaction variable does not get a statistically significant result. Therefore,
there is no statistical difference between common and civil law governments. The result of
the previous regression analysis in Table 3 stands.
Models 2, 3 and 4 represent the results for environmental, social and corporate gover-
nance scores respectively. Both the national government ownership and interaction vari-
able are significant in model 2. The result shows that the effect of national government
ownership in common law countries has a positive and statistically significant coefficient
(12.648) on the environmental score. However, in civil law countries the impact is negative
(12.648− (18.297 ∗ 1)) = −5, 649.
Although national government ownership had an impact on social score in Table 3
Model 3, when the interaction term is added the coefficients for both national government
ownership and the interaction variable become non-significant. This implies that there is
no difference between the effects of national government ownership based on the two legal
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Table 4: Regression model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
National government ownership −8.647∗∗ 12.648∗∗ 1.137 −15.095∗∗
(3.810) (6.160) (5.881) (6.092)
National government ownership * Civil law dummy −3.522 −18.297∗∗∗ −9.151 −1.024
(4.167) (6.739) (6.433) (6.664)
Log (Assets) 13.433∗∗∗ 17.677∗∗∗ 15.052∗∗∗ 7.697∗∗∗
(0.414) (0.669) (0.639) (0.662)
Civil law dummy −5.242∗∗∗ −3.904∗∗∗ −2.936∗∗∗ −31.672∗∗∗
(0.627) (1.014) (0.968) (1.002)
ROA 0.074 −0.018 0.223∗∗ −0.161
(0.063) (0.102) (0.097) (0.101)
Board gender diversity 0.273∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035)
Leverage 0.003 0.045∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Revenue growth −3.998∗ −13.528∗∗∗ −8.099∗∗ −0.606
(2.424) (3.920) (3.742) (3.876)
Dividend dummy 3.247∗∗∗ 6.873∗∗∗ 6.726∗∗∗ 2.741∗∗
(0.720) (1.164) (1.111) (1.151)
Log (GDP per capita) −3.937 −7.372 −2.542 16.378∗∗∗
(2.799) (4.526) (4.320) (4.475)
GDP growth −0.456∗∗∗ −1.057∗∗∗ −1.029∗∗∗ −0.691∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.198) (0.189) (0.196)
Constant −60.064∗∗∗ −95.827∗∗∗ −82.634∗∗∗ −76.727∗∗∗
(13.204) (21.351) (20.382) (21.113)
Observations 2,640 2,640 2,640 2,640
R2 0.437 0.445 0.383 0.372
Adjusted R2 0.432 0.440 0.377 0.366
Residual Std. Error (df = 2616) 12.597 20.370 19.445 20.143
F Statistic (df = 23; 2616) 88.158∗∗∗ 91.210∗∗∗ 70.477∗∗∗ 67.338∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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origins. In Model 4, the added interaction term is not statistically significant, meaning
that as in Model 1 the impact of national government ownership is not based on the legal
origin of the country. The national government coefficient remains negative (-15.095) and
significant.
As previously mentioned, our data and regression analysis does not consider the effect of
reverse causality. The firms governments own may be already performing worse than their
counterparts. Therefore, the result based on the regression analysis conducted suggests
that national government ownership has a negative impact on ESG, social and corporate
governance performance may not be robust. The univariate one sample Student’s t-test
was implemented to measure the change in performance at different national government
ownership levels.
The results of the Student’s t-tests conducted can be found in Table 5. For the change
in ESG score when national government increases (decreases) is not statistically significant
in either case. This suggests that the change in ESG score is not related to the change
in national government ownership. The test is significant in both cases for environmental
score but the mean is positive when national government ownership increases and decreases.
Thus, the change in national government ownership cannot be strictly associated with
change in environmental performance.
Based on the analysis, social and corporate governance score change is in relation with
the change in national government ownership. Social score increases when national gov-
ernment ownership decreases and corporate governance score decreases when ownership
increases. However, the results were only significant for one side of the change for these two
scores. The t-tests carried out do not give an unambiguous explanation to the question of
reverse causality due to the nature of the test and the results obtained.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of national government ownership on
the environmental, social and corporate governance performance (ESG) in companies in the
EU. ESG data for both government and non-government owned companies was gathered
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Table 5: Student’s t-test results
The table represents the results of the Student’s t-test conducted on the changes in the four different
performance scores when national government ownership increases and decreases. The sample size for the
positive changes in national government ownership is 95 and 129 for the negative changes. The number
represented illustrates the mean of the change in the variable in question.
Change
National government ownership Positive Negative
ESG score 0.824 0.541
Environmental score 1.604** 1.001**
Social score 0.705 1.560***
Corporate Governance score -2.663** -0.003
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
and the regression analysis was conducted with a sample of 528 companies of which 108
had national government ownership during the time period 2011-2015. Also, the difference
between national government ownership in civil and common law countries was analyzed.
The primary regression model used finds that there is a statistically and economically
significant negative relation between national government ownership and ESG score. Fur-
ther analysis of the three categories separately indicates that the negative impact is due
to the performance in the social and corporate governance measures. The environmen-
tal performance score is not significantly impacted. However, after an interaction variable
between national government ownership is added, the regression results suggest that in com-
mon law countries national government ownership has a positive effect on environmental
score and in civil law countries the effect is negative. The interaction variable does not have
a statistically significant effect in the other regressions.
The findings are in line with previous research as a significant negative impact on corpo-
rate governance was found due to national government ownership. However, the addition of
the interaction term did not indicate a difference between civil and common law countries
in this regression as it did in previous research.
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The shortcoming of the regression analysis conducted in this paper has to do with the
possibility of reverse causality as mentioned before, even though there was an attempted to
limit this by utilizing the univariate robustness check for change in dependent variable when
national government ownership changes. Therefore, the paper cannot precisely conclude if
the national government ownership is the actual causation of the negative impact.
Possible future research could focus more on the issue of reverse causality. The issue
could be tackled by gathering the national government ownership only from privatized
companies, as they have been previously completely owned by the government. A regression
analysis on the change of ESG score on the change of national government ownership and
control variables could also be conducted for a more robust estimate of the causality. Future
research on the subject could also implement a matching of privately and partly publicly
owned firms for the regression analysis as Borisova et al. (2012) do in their paper.
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